Abstract Recent literature has paid attention to a demarcation problem for evolutionary debunking arguments. This is the problem of asking in virtue of what regulative metaepistemic norm evolutionary considerations either render a belief justified, or debunk it as unjustified. I examine the so-called 'Milvian Bridge principle' (cf. Griffiths and Wilkins (in: Maclaurin, Dawes (eds) A new science of religion, Routledge, New York, 2012; Sloan, McKenny, Eggelson (eds) Darwin in the 21st century: nature, humanity, and God, University Press, Notre Dame, 2015)), which offers exactly such a called for regulative metaepistemic norm. The Milvian Bridge principle suggests that the metaepistemic norm is: adaptive reliability for truth of cognitive processes that the existence of corresponding truth-making facts evolutionary theory justifies. I argue that the Milvian Bridge principle is problematic on a number of counts, something that is shown via spiraling 'companions in guilt arguments'. Finally, I consider 'the core reductionist objection' to the critique of the Milvian Bridge principle and offer a response. I conclude that the Milvian Bridge principle is destabilized.
Causal Premise: S's belief that p is explained by X. Epistemic Premise: X is an (off-/on-)track process. Therefore, S's belief that p is (un-)justified. 1 On the one hand, appeals to evolutionary considerations that result in debunking arguments suggest in the ambivalent epistemic premise that X is an off-track process. 2 Such arguments have notably been applied to moral, religious, color, ordinary objects beliefs as well as to various kinds of cognitive illusions beliefs (such as so-called positive illusions and thermoreceptive illusions) and even mathematics and logic beliefs. 3 On the other hand, appeals to evolutionary considerations that result in justifying arguments suggest in the ambivalent epistemic premise that X is an on-track process. Such arguments have been applied to cognitive processes (and their doxastic output) such as induction, abduction, deduction, perception, memory, the belief in an external world, understanding of other minds and beyond. 4 Recent work has paid attention to a demarcation problem for such epistemic appeals to evolutionary considerations. This is the problem of asking in virtue of what regulative metaepistemic norm evolutionary considerations render a belief justified or debunk it as unjustified. 5 The problem is serious because it seems that, in the absence of a regulative metaepistemic norm, any appeal to evolutionary considerations in order to justify or debunk beliefs would be ad hoc.
That is, it would be ad hoc because it could always be asked why we do not appeal to the same evolutionary considerations in order to justify instead of debunk some 1 Such 'genealogical' arguments need not be evolutionary in particular (cf. Shafer-Landau (2012: pp. 1-2) for the same point). They could be sociological, psychological, historical etc. and understand the causal premise accordingly. See Harman (1977: pp. 3-10) for a sociological genealogical argument against moral beliefs and Freud (1989) for a psychological argument against religious beliefs. 2 I assume an understanding of the tracking condition in terms of the first-order epistemic norm of reliability. Roughly, a process is on-track iff it reliably tracks respective facts and produces a preponderance of true beliefs. Otherwise, it is off-track and unreliable. 3 See Joyce's (2006) , Kitcher's (2007) and Street's (2006 Street's ( , 2009 debunking of normative beliefs, Schechter (2013) for logic beliefs, Clarke-Doane's (2012) for maths beliefs, Boghossian's and Velleman's (1989) for color beliefs, Korman's (2014) McKay and Dennett (2009: p. 505 ) refer to 'unrealistically positive selfevaluations, exaggerated perceptions of personal control or mastery, and unrealistic optimism about the future'. With thermoreception De Cruz's et al. (2011: p. 532) refer to 'the system that reacts to surface skin temperatures'. This cognitive process is not very reliable since it tends, for evolutionary reasons, to represent the temperature conducive to an organism's fitness and survival, not the accurate temperature. 4 See, for example, Quine (1975) and Street (2009) for induction, Goldman (1990) for abduction, Schechter (2013) for deduction, Stewart-Williams (2005) for the belief in an independent external world, Millikan (1984) and Wilkins (2012, 2015) for perception/representation, Papineau (2003) for understanding of other minds and Boulter (2007) for memory.
beliefs (and vice versa) . 6 Insofar as evolutionary arguments are sometimes used to debunk, and other times to justify beliefs, the adhocness concern seems potent and reasonable. In Sects. 2 and 3 I present and criticize the so-called 'Milvian Bridge principle' (cf. Wilkins (2012, 2015) , which exactly offers such a looked for regulative metaepistemic norm. In Sect. 4 consider 'the core reductionist objection' to the critique of the Milvian Bridge principle and in Sect. 5 offer a brief reply. Wilkins (2012, 2015) offer an interesting response to the demarcation problem via what they call 'the Milvian Bridge principle'. Roughly, the Milvian Bridge principle concurs that evolved cognitive processes are generally reliable and truthtracking because in this way our hunters-gatherers ancestors managed to acquire sufficient factual, empirical knowledge (i.e. for food, shelter, predation etc.) that was instrumental to survival and reproduction. Although natural selection does not directly select for truth it does generally and indirectly select of truth because truth promotes survival and reproduction. But some evolved processes are not reliable and truth-tracking because evolutionary theory does not justify the existence of corresponding truth-making (natural) facts (e.g. moral, religious, modal, metaphysical, aesthetic facts).
The Milvian Bridge principle
Hence, we can distinguish which processes are reliable and truth-tracking and which are not, on the basis of what truth-making facts the framework of evolutionary theory could itself justify. The evolution-based, regulative metaepistemic norm is now straightforward: namely, adaptive and reliable processes that the existence of corresponding truth-making facts they involve is justified by evolutionary theory itself. Corresponding truth-making facts the existence of which evolutionary theory does not countenance are debunked as unjustified. Below is the Milvian Bridge 7 principle as Wilkins (2015: section 2, 2012 : section 2) stipulate it:
Milvian Bridge: The X facts are related to the evolutionary success of X beliefs in such a way that it is reasonable to accept and act on X beliefs produced by our evolved cognitive faculties.
The Milvian Bridge principle is supposed to regulate the correct application of the ambivalent epistemic premise. Thus, evolutionary arguments (justifying or debunking) should have the following revised structure:
Causal Premise: S's belief that p is explained by X. Epistemic Premise: X is an (off-/on-)track process. 6 As there is general consensus about the first-order epistemic norm of reliability, the question is about the metaepistemic norm regulative of its application to different domains and beliefs. 7 They name it 'the Milvian Bridge' principle after the Milvian Bridge battle (312 AD) of Constantine the Great that allegedly Constantine won due to the truth of Christianity. The idea is that Constantine won due to the perceived truth of Christianity that helped galvanize the morale of his troops, independently of whether Christianity is really true. In analogy, moral, religious and other talk and thought may have been adaptive although there are no corresponding moral and religious facts/truths. Such talk and thought is useful but it doesn't correspond to anything.
Milvian Bridge: The X facts are related to the evolutionary success of X beliefs in such a way that it is reasonable to accept and act on X beliefs produced by our evolved cognitive faculties. In such conditions, the X process is reliable. Otherwise, the X process is unreliable. Therefore, S's belief that p is (un-)justified. Wilkins (2012: section 4, 2015: section 4) apply the principle in order to justify Moorean, commonsense beliefs (perceptual, memorial) and extend it to justify scientific beliefs, but think that the application of the principle debunks moral and religious beliefs as unjustified. 8 According to their view, commonsense natural facts (perceptual, memorial) relate to the evolutionary success of corresponding commonsense beliefs and, therefore, it is reasonable to accept and act upon such beliefs. As scientific facts grow out of these commonsense facts (by means of abductive reasoning, which has also evolved (cf. Goldman (1990) ), and an experimental trial-and-error process), they are also reasonable to accept and act upon.
But objective moral and religious facts (that if exist are, plausibly, irreducible) do not relate to the evolutionary success of corresponding moral and religious belief and, therefore, these beliefs are unreasonable to accept as justified (2012: section 5 & 6, 2015: section 5 & 6) . Evolutionary theory does not justify belief in the existence of such (irreducible) facts because moral and religious beliefs, probably, have been adaptive without any required ontological commitment to corresponding irreducible facts. 9 In slogan form, pragmatic success is one thing, truth quite another. 10 They conclude that, in virtue of the Milvian Bridge principle, we can neatly demarcate between domains of belief that, on the basis of evolutionary considerations, are justified and domains of belief that are unjustified and should be debunked.
The Milvian Bridge principle notwithstanding, in what follows I suggest that it is questionable whether it can regulate the application of the first-order, epistemic norm of reliability.
The Milvian Bridge destabilized
The concern is that the Milvian Bridge principle seems to prove too much on a number of counts and this can be shown via spiraling 'companions in guilt arguments '. 11 First, the principle seems to entail its own epistemic self-defeat in at least two different ways. On the one hand, the principle itself does not satisfy the epistemic rationality standard for ontological commitment that it purports to set. Recall the principle: 'Milvian Bridge: The X facts are related to the evolutionary success of X beliefs in such a way that it is reasonable to accept and act on X beliefs produced by our evolved cognitive faculties. ' However, the Milvian Bridge fact itself is not prima facie related to the evolutionary success in a way that is reasonable to accept and act upon this belief produced by our evolved cognitive faculties. 12 This is the case because it is hard to envisage how the Milvian Bridge fact could be related to the evolutionary success of our Pleistocene ancestors in a way that is reasonable to accept and act upon this belief produced by our evolved cognitive faculties. 13 As a result, by the principle's own light we should not believe the principle.
On the other hand, the Milvian Bridge principle is epistemically self-defeating in a second way. This is the case because when the principle is used to launch evolutionary debunking arguments against normative beliefs (e.g. Griffiths and Wilkins (2015: section 5)), it entails an evaluative-epistemic assertion which itself claims that evolution is not a reliable and truth-tracking process with respect to normative-evaluative truth. 14 This much is captured by the off-track construal of the epistemic premise of evolutionary normative debunking arguments. However, this implies that, by the epistemic premise's own lights, the epistemic premise is unjustified because it is itself evaluative. 15 Thus, debunking evaluative truths implies debunking debunking evolutionary arguments because they rely on evaluative truths. For one thing, they rely on at least the evaluative, epistemic truth that evolutionary theory is justified-which clearly is. 16 11 For various such arguments see Shafer-Landau (2003) , Cuneo (2007) and Rowland (2013) .
12 Such self-defeat arguments are often run by anti-reductionists against naturalistic metaphysical principles. See for example Shafer-Landau (2003: pp. 110-114) on the Shoemakerian 'causal criterion of ontological legitimacy'. I explore epistemic self-defeat worries against evolutionary debunking in Kyriacou (2016a) and in Kyriacou (2017a) rely on results from cognitive psychology to run an evolutionary debunking argument against expressivism (or at least against 'the core expressivist maneuver'). 13 See Cuneo and Shafer-Landau (2014: pp. 427-428) and Huemer (2008: p. 216 ) for a similar point.
14 I assume here the relatively uncontroversial thesis that epistemic claims are evaluative (cf. Kim (1988) , Cuneo (2007) , Kyriacou (2012) , Kyriacou (2016c) ). Some philosophers go even further and suggest that the evaluative/normative aspects of epistemic and moral domains run in parallel and therefore they should share the same metanormative fate (realist or antirealist). See Kim (1988) , Cuneo (2007) , Rowland (2013) , Das (2016b) and Cuneo and Kyriacou (forthcoming) . Others such as Lenman (2008) , Heathwood (2009 ), Olson (2011 and Cowie (2014 Cowie ( , 2016 contest this. Much depends on this contention, as we shall discuss in the next section. 15 Epistemic self-defeat that implies undercutting is to be distinguished from the stronger logical self-defeat that implies contradiction and, thus, rebutting (e.g. the self-referential semantic paradoxes). See Fumerton (1995: pp. 43-53) for discussion of the distinction. 16 See Vavova (2014: p. 12 ) and Kyriacou (2016a) for a similar point against evolutionary normative debunking. See Pust (2001) for the same general point against Harman-style, genealogical debunking Second, in the same vein with the second self-defeat problem, evolutionary normative debunking seems also to rely on a host of other evaluative, metaepistemic truths/norms/facts (regulative of rational doxastic conduct) that should be debunked by the lights of the Milvian Bridge principle. Such norms are that 'We ought to pursue the truth and avoid falsity, be logically and probabilistically consistent, sensitive to counterevidence, proportionate belief on evidence, be intellectually honest, openminded, fair, love truth' etc.
Perhaps these norms are even indispensable for rational reasoning, as some have proposed (cf. Cuneo (2007: p. 229) ), something that would make things even worse for the principle. Besides, evolutionary normative debunking relies on the Milvian Bridge principle itself, which is a metaepistemic norm i.e. a metaepistemic rationality principle regulating the application of the reliability norm (and epistemically rational ontological commitment). A fortiori, at least some of these metaepistemic truths bear an air of aprioricity 17 and that this complicates the problem even further because it is not clear how strongly naturalistic-evolutionary stories account for (normative) aprioricity and its normative authority.
Third, recall how Griffiths and Wilkins employ the principle: Moorean, commonsense facts (perceptual, memorial) relate to the evolutionary success of corresponding commonsense beliefs and, therefore, are reasonable to accept and act upon. But objective moral and religious facts do not relate to the evolutionary success of corresponding moral and religious belief and, therefore, are unreasonable to accept. Evolutionary theory does not justify belief in the existence of such facts because moral and religious beliefs, probably, have been adaptive without any required ontological commitment to corresponding facts. This is problematic, though, because it is not clear what common sense facts are. 18 Griffiths and Wilkins seem to assume that the objects of perception and memory are common sense facts, but not the objects of moral and religious beliefs. But this does not withstand scrutiny if we accept either of two prominent understandings of what common sense means. If common sense has to do with what ordinary common folks are disposed to believe or think they know, then we also need to make space for the objects and facts of moral and religious beliefs because dispositions for moral and religious beliefs (and claims of knowledge thereof) seem to be ubiquitous across time, space and cultures. This was probably not the semantic intention of Griffiths and Wilkins (2012, Footnote 16 continued arguments that seek to undermine 'the evidential worth' of intuitions (moral, metaphysical and epistemic). Thanks to an anonymous referee that brought Pust (2001) to my attention. 17 Of late, the a priori is not seen with as much Quinean skepticism. See Bonjour (1998) for a defense of a priori justification and Huemer (2008) and Cuneo and Shafer-Landau (2014) for a defense of moral a priori, what Cuneo and Shafer-Landau (2014) call 'moral fixed points'. If the moral-epistemic parity holds and the Cuneo-Shafer-Landau argument is sound, there may also exist epistemic fixed points, such as that knowledge entails truth. I explore this possibility elsewhere (MS). 18 See Lemos (2004) for Reid, Moore and Chisholm on common sense and Grecoric (2007) for Aristotle on common sense. Lemos (2004: p. xii) seems to think of common sense as 'the things we ordinarily think we know'. This falls under our first understanding of common sense, which is problematic for Griffiths and Wilkins. Grecoric (2007: preface) distinguishes between our modern conception that has to do with 'a rational ability' and Aristotle's conception that has to do with 'a perceptual ability'. The Aristotelian reading seems similar to our second understanding, which is also problematic for Griffiths and Wilkins. 2015) because we should be charitable enough to think that they would have known better than commit to this obviously unpalatable (by their own lights) understanding.
An alternative understanding is that with common sense facts Griffiths and Wilkins mean prosaic natural facts. This is also a more charitable reading because it comports with their pervasive naturalism. Even so, it is unclear whether moral and religious facts are not prosaic natural facts (at least in the minimal sense that they supervene on natural facts and properties) and the objects of perception. Moral perception has recently been defended at length by many authors [cf. Greco (2000) , McGrath (2004) , Cullison (2010) , McBrayer (2010), Cowan (2015) ] and, more contentiously, some have argued even for the possibility of religious perception (cf. Alston (1991 ), Gellman (2008 ). So, if moral and religious facts are prosaic natural facts, they are common sense facts and by their own lights should be kept in our ontology.
Thus, even if we accept for the sake of the argument that the Milvian Bridge principle can justify itself and avoid self-defeat, resolve worries about metaepistemic norms/facts and aprioricity (perhaps in a Quinean way) and it is the missing regulative metaepistemic norm, it is unclear whether it justifies what Griffiths and Wilkins take it, on the one hand, to justify (perception, memory, indirectly science) and, on the other hand, to debunk (morality, religion). Given this ambiguity about the domains of proper application of the principle, the initial demarcation problem seems to remain intact.
Fourth, conversely, it is not clear that we could even assume that the objects of perception and memory are mind-independent, prosaic natural facts, objects etc. by the very lights of the Milvian Bridge principle itself. The Milvian Bridge principle itself does not justify the reality of prosaic natural facts, objects etc. because this is not justified by evolutionary theory as a biological theory simpliciter (see Korman (2014) for detailed discussion). Perhaps some form of naturalism justifies their reality, but this is a different, metaphysical claim.
But it is simply assumed by Wilkins (2012, 2015) that they are real, something that begs the question against alternative metaphysics and revisits the initial problem. 19 For if we deny the reality and mind-independence of moral and religious facts and truths, then by parity of reasoning, we could do just the same for the objects of perception and memory. This is especially the case because, as we have seen, some have argued that moral and religious perception is, in principle, defensible.
Otherwise, we beg the question against the idealist, the skeptic, the nihilist-bundle theorist etc. who deny the reality of such prosaic natural facts, objects etc. In other words, it seems that if Griffiths' and Wilkins' debunking argument works against moral and religious realism, by parity of reasoning it should work for external world realism (facts, objects etc.) as well. Indeed, by parity of reasoning it could generalize globally and work against the justification of any kind of realism (epistemic, logical, probabilistic, modal, semantic, mathematical, ordinary object etc.) inexorably leading to disastrous universal skepticism. For one thing in the absence of epistemic facts/reasons, we would have no good reasons to believe anything whatsoever, which is an unpalatable result for almost everybody. 20 By contraposition, if we accept the reality and mind-independence of moral and religious facts, then by parity of reasoning we could do just the same with mindindependent external natural facts, objects etc. Evolution as a biological theory simpliciter does not justify the external world existence more than any other empirical science theory does and anyone who has read some Descartes, Berkeley, Hume or Kant knows that our best science (and Darwinian evolution) is compatible with a skeptical or an idealistic metaphysics of reality (subjective or transcendental).
Trivial as it might seem, it takes philosophical work, namely, a metaphysical and epistemological theory to ground the existence of the external reality, not a biological one. I conclude that either the Milvian Bridge principle debunks virtually everything (even ordinary natural facts and objects) or in an ad hoc and question-begging way applies double standards to debunk only some of the facts that could be debunked by its own lights (something that revisits the demarcation problem).
Fifth, Griffiths and Wilkins extend and apply the Milvian Bridge principle not only to common sense beliefs (perceptual, memorial) in order to justify them but, indirectly, also to scientific beliefs. But here they face the demarcation problem as well. For if science and philosophy have broadly analogous methodologies, that is, roughly build theories that postulate posits and entities to abductively explain bodies of data in the best possible way, as they seem to be, by parity of reasoning, we should accept philosophical beliefs as well. 21 At least accept our best philosophical theories beliefs, as we accept our best scientific theories beliefs. 22 The problem now is that at least some competent philosophers believe, on the very basis of this methodology, in moral and religious facts and it is an open question which moral and religious theories are our best (realist, constructivist or antirealist theories)-unless one is dogmatic, of course. Realist theories, although contentious to say the least, are serious contenders in the theoretical market, at any rate, and this suffices for the point to go through. We cannot assume that moral and religious realism is wrong if there are serious realist philosophical theories and philosophy and science are, broadly speaking, methodologically analogous. I conclude again that either the Milvian Bridge principle debunks science and philosophy (and thereby debunks, again, itself) or in an ad hoc and question-begging way applies double standards to debunk only some of the facts that could be debunked by its own lights.
Sixth, our previous discussion so far culminates in the general methodological worry that the Milvian Bridge principle is ad hoc and question-begging because it 20 See Boghossian (2006) , Cuneo (2007) , Rowland (2013) and Kyriacou (2016a , 2017a for versions of this idea. For a bold epistemologist that has openly accepted skepticism about justification/reasons for belief see Unger (1975) . Of note, is that a moderate skeptic about knowledge need not be a skeptic about justification/reason for belief, see Kyriacou (2017b) . In addition, if logic norms are debunked, then the very principle of non-contradiction goes by the board. See Putnam (1978) for a similar point against Quine (1953) But even if we grant the identified dubious presuppositions to the Milvian Bridge principle for the sake of the argument, the principle would still be in trouble because it simply decides the ontological/philosophical matter of what facts to countenance from the start, namely, reductive natural facts and this, again, begs the question against antireductionists about, say, normative, religious, mathematical, logical, modal, ordinary objects facts etc. 24 Thus, the demarcation problem resurfaces yet again. Worthy of note is also that evolutionary theory as a biological theory simpliciter is strictly speaking silent about irreducible normative (and other) facts and in principle could be rendered coherent (even if not ultimately plausible) with such a story. 25 It is only the metaphysical position of strong reductionist naturalism that speaks against irreducible facts, not the biological theory of evolution per se. 26 Indeed, some would suggest that a weaker antireductionist naturalism could, in principle, have the best of both worlds: respect realist seemings (normative and other) in accordance with a plausible metaphysical supervenience thesis, respect empirical evolutionary theory and avoid epistemic self-defeat. Besides, realist seemings (normative and other) are also empirical data that a theory should account for (either save or debunk) and the most direct (and prima facie less ad hoc and non-revisionist) way to do so is in a realist theory that saves seemings. Then, of course, epistemic challenges such as Street's (2006) evolutionary dilemma against normative realism, disagreement challenges etc. would become pressing but this is a further question down the road. 27 To sum up, I have argued that the principle is beset by spiraling 'companions in guilt arguments' about (a) self-coherence (b) overgeneralization (by parity maneuvers) that excludes from our ontological inventory (perhaps indispensable?) metaepistemic facts, some of which might be a priori known, prosaic natural facts and objects, science and philosophy. The overgeneralization inevitably also (c) entails universal skepticism 23 As an anonymous referee pointed out, the Quine-Duhem thesis about under-determination of theory by evidence indicates that 'no theory in isolation justifies beliefs in anything' and if the background of assumed metaphysical beliefs are not justified by the Milvian Bridge principle itself, then 'we are back to square one with the original demarcation problem'. 24 See FitzPatrick (2015) and Das (2016a: section 2) for discussion of the point. Compare FitzPatrick (2015: p. 883): "…evolutionary debunking arguments…rely on strong explanatory claims about our moral beliefs that are simply not supported by the science unless it is supplemented by philosophical claims that just beg the question against realism from the start." 25 It is also to be noted that the very phenomenon biology studies, life, seems by the lights of many biologists and biochemists irreducible to more basic molecular mechanisms. So it is a moot point whether even biology's own subject-matter is reducible. See Ball (2003: pp. 33-35) for such pessimism. Others of course are more optimistic, such as Dawkins (2006b: Ch. 6 Kyriacou (2016b: p. 3) for similar points. Of note is that we could have an even stronger form of naturalism than strong reductionism: eliminativist naturalism such as Churchland (1981) about any realism (including epistemic realism about justification/reasons for belief, something that incurs epistemic self-defeat) and (d) begs the question (against metaphysical alternatives) with an implicit commitment to strong reductionist naturalism.
I conclude that the Milvian Bridge principle is unstable. Of course, I take these objections not to be conclusive but to make a presumptive case against the Milvian Bridge.
The core reductionist objection
There is a core reductionist objection that threatens to undermine our spiraling 'companions in guilt' critique of the Milvian Bridge principle. The core reductionist objection is that the Milvian Bridge principle could, in principle, avoid the charge of being epistemically self-defeating, as well as the spiraling 'companions in guilt' arguments we have offered, given that we could support the claim that epistemic justification/reasons for belief are reducible to probability and evidence, where these are ultimately to be reduced to descriptive-empirical terms.
The thought is that the principle is epistemically self-defeating only if we lump together two different kinds of normative-evaluative beliefs that should be kept distinct: moral and epistemic. If we debunk both moral evaluative beliefs and epistemic evaluative beliefs as unjustified, then we face epistemic self-defeat problems and spiraling 'companions in guilt' parity arguments. For if all beliefs are unjustified by the lights of evolutionary theory-reductionist naturalism, then nothing can be justified and we are ushered into universal skepticism.
But this need not be the case, the objection continues, because moral and epistemic beliefs need not be on a theoretical par [pace Kim (1988) , Cuneo (2007) , Rowland (2013 Rowland ( , 2016 , Das (2016b) and Cuneo and Kyriacou (forthcoming)]. We may debunk moral (and other) beliefs as unjustified, though, not epistemic beliefs as unjustified because we could adopt a realist but naturalistic reductionist position about epistemic properties such as epistemic reasonability/justification. So we could be moral, religious, metaphysical, aesthetic etc. skeptics but not epistemic reasonability skeptics. As Lenman (2008) , Heathwood (2009) and Olson (2011 Olson ( , 2014 have argued, if we assume that epistemic reasonability/justification is reducible to likelihood for truth, given the evidence, and likelihood for truth, given the evidence, reducible to descriptive-empirical evidence, then the problem is defused. 28 So, epistemic reasonability/justification and corresponding reasons for belief could be reducible to evidential likelihood and by extension to empirical evidence. 29 Given that empirical evidence supports the reasonability of the Milvian Bridge principle 28 Similar reductionist, evidentialist theories are hinted to by other evolutionary debunkers. See Dawkins (2006a: pp. 319-323) for instance. 29 It should be observed that Heathwood (2009) suggests that reasonable belief is conceptually reducible to probability and empirical evidence (via an 'open question argument'). Yet this is an a priori analytic truth that by the stipulation of his account of reasonability should not be considered reasonable because reasonability is ultimately reduced to descriptive evidence. Hence, either his account of evidence is selfdefeating because it is too restrictive or he is talking about the reasonability of empirical beliefs in particular (while also allowing for a priori justification). For charity's sake I assume the latter. itself, the epistemic self-defeat worries are defused. Given that empirical evidence does not support the reasonability of religion and morality (via the Milvian Bridge principle), Griffiths and Wilkins can capitalize on the reductionist account and suggest that religion and morality are unjustified and should be debunked while perception (and by extension science and perhaps a form of naturalized philosophy) are justified. 30 So there is no ad hoc application of the principle because its application is grounded on empirical evidence, which is the mark of reasonable belief (at least in empiricist circles). It could also defuse skepticism about reasonability/justification because it is a reductionist-realist theory of reasonability/justification that can be utilized to support the metaphysics of strong reductionist naturalism (though, it cannot as easily undermine the second worry to the extent that this has to do with a priori metaepistemic truths; but perhaps it would opt for a Carnapian or Quinean position on the a priori). 31 Finally, it could be used with the hope to support various sorts of reductionist realism (mathematical, modal, logical etc.) . In sum, the spiraling 'companions-in-guilt' arguments could in principle be unraveled. This is 'the core reductionist objection'.
A brief reply to the objection
I suggest that reductionism about epistemic reasonability is not prima facie plausible and, therefore, there is no easy resolution of the epistemic self-defeat problems and the 'companions in guilt' maneuver via this route. Hence, concerns about the Milvian Bridge principle should not subside. 32 In what follows, I focus on Heathwood's (2009) reductionist account but what is said, mutatis mutandis, carries over to other similar proposals.
Heathwood (2009) suggests-via an epistemic open question argument-that it is intuitively self-contradictory to suggest that 'p is likely, given the evidence, but it is not (epistemically) reasonable to believe'. According to Heathwood (2009) , this indicates that it is a conceptual truth that epistemic reasonability is reducible to likelihood for truth, given the evidence (where the evidence is reducible to descriptive experience).
To illustrate his point, Heathwood (2009: p. 90 ) offers the following example: "Suppose I am having a visual experience as of a table in front of me. Suppose this in fact makes it very likely that there is a table in front of me. Now I say, 'Yes, I see that it's quite likely to be true that there is a table in front of me, but, still, I don't think it's reasonable for me to believe that there is a table in front of me'. This is a puzzling thing to hear. It seems to be grounds for thinking that I do not really understand what I am saying… [t] his suggests that it might be true that all that reasonable belief amounts to is likely truth and that analytic descriptivism is true of epistemic normativity." 30 As we have seen, this is more contentious than it might seem at first sight because both moral and religious perception have competent defenders. But we can concede, for the sake of argument here, that a serious case can be made that there is no real moral and religion perception of a corresponding ontology. 31 Of course, this is easier said than done, but for current purposes we can concede that, in principle, it opens a possible line of response to the overgeneralization worry. 32 See Rowland (2013) and Cuneo and Kyriacou (forthcoming) for a critique of naturalistic reductionism about epistemic reasonability. Cuneo and Kyriacou (forthcoming) explore some of the themes canvassed in this section against epistemic reductionism.
Heathwood (2009) notwithstanding, it is far from clear that we can have a reductionist analysis of epistemic reasonability/reasons for belief by mere appeal to probability and (empirical) evidence. 33 It is far from clear even if, first, we grant that we focus on empirical reasonability/reasons for belief and ignore a priori reasonability (that seems by definition independent of empirical evidence) and, second, set aside externalist worries about the appeal to rather internalist concepts like probability and evidence. 34 The basic problem is that even probability (at least in its relevant epistemic interpretation) and evidence are normative concepts that seem themselves irreducible to mere empirical perception (i.e. descriptive experience). So to analyze epistemic reasonability in terms of probability and empirical perception is simply to transpose the problem to the next level of analysis, not to really address it. 35 Thus, the appeal to probability and evidence won't make the seemingly irreducible epistemic normativity of reasonability go away. Let us elaborate.
If, as in Heathwood's example, we have a certain perceptual experience of a table, it is an epistemic, normative question whether we ought to treat this experience as veridical evidence, or total evidence, or at least as relevant empirical evidence, and how strongly it supports or undercuts a given hypothesis-belief. 36 Thus, there are respective questions about veridicality, what the total evidence is, what the total available evidence is, what the total, available, relevant evidence is and about how to weigh the epistemic import or value of this relevant evidence.
There is also the pertinent question about what (relevant) evidence any reasonably virtuous (i.e. attentive, responsible, conscientious etc.) agent could and should be taking into consideration in the context. For, surely, we cannot expect an agent to be evidentially omniscient and be aware of all (relevant) evidence in circumstances where she cannot be aware of at least some evidence. So, in analogue to the moral case, it seems that there is no direct, unaided by independent epistemic norms, inference from descriptive experience (Humean 'is') to ought to believe (Humean 'ought').
Return to Heathwood's (2009) Das (2016b) and Cuneo and Kyriacou (forthcoming) . For some optimism see Lenman (2008) , Olson (2011) and Cowie (2014 Cowie ( , 2016 . Lillehammer and Moller (2015) explore a version of coherentism about epistemic rationality that could still be friendly to error theory. I attempt to criticize this position elsewhere (MS). 34 Note that many epistemologists would be inimical to such a probabilistic understanding of reasonability on various grounds (cf. Pollock (1986 ), Nozick (1993 ). For one thing, many externalists (e.g. reliabilists) would question any appeal to prima facie internalist notions like evidence and/or probability. Reformed epistemologists come to mind such as Alston (1991 Alston ( , 2006 , Plantinga (1993) and Wolterstorff (2008) who have inveighed against 'enlightement evidentialism'. 35 It is not accidental that epistemological open question arguments have been run in the epistemic domain as well(pace Heathwood (2009)), and look as prima facie attractive as their moral analogues (cf. Greco (2015) ). 36 See also Hajek (2011) , Section 3.2 for some critical discussion of Carnap's requirement of total evidence. See also Handfield (2012: pp. 23-30) for discussion of what counts as 'admissible' and 'available evidence'. Kelly (2014) is a nice introduction to the intricacies of evidence. experience justifies belief of the presence of a table because this begs the question against the relevant alternative of the hologram in the context. 37 Thus, the aforementioned epistemic questions are all normative questions that mere appeal to probability, evidence and descriptive experience will not address. So the conceptual analysis of epistemic reasonability in terms of probability, evidence and descriptive experience at best transposes the initial problem to the next level of analysis, but does little in the way of really addressing it. Heathwood (2009: pp. 92-93 ) is aware of the objection that probability is an irreducibly normative notion but thinks it implausible. 38 He takes probability to be a merely descriptive, naturalistic notion with nothing inherently irreducibly normative. The basic argument he adduces in support of his claim is the following. Heathwood (2009: p. 93) proposes that probability claims are made true not by 'the attitudes of rational observers' but by descriptive, natural facts in the world, ('objective patterns in the world', as he says).
He gives two examples to rest his case. The first example is an inductive one and builds on the 'connection' between two events: streets being wet and having rained. What makes it true that is probable that it has rained is the natural fact that streets are wet, Heathwood comments. The second example is a deductive one and relies on transitivity. If Xena is older than Yolanda and Yolanda is older than Zooey, Xena is older than Zooey. What makes this claim necessarily true (and therefore probably true) Heathwood (2009: p. 93) comments, is the natural fact that Xena is being older than Yolanda and Yolanda is being older that Zooey entails that Xena is older than Zooey.
With this argument in hand, Heathwood (2009: p. 93) concludes with a parallel with Hume's law about moral 'is/ought' suggesting that epistemic/probability assertions (such as 'it's unlikely to rain tomorrow') belong to the descriptively natural 'is' side of the distinction and not to the normative 'ought' side of the distinction where, plausibly, moral assertions (such as 'murder is wrong') belong. This parallel is supposed to conclude his case for the assertion that while moral facts are normative and irreducible, epistemic facts are nonnormative and reducible and, therefore, there is a disparity between the moral and the epistemic (which is meant to undermine Cuneo's (2007) moral-epistemic parity thesis).
Heathwood's argument is interesting, but questionable. Suppose we assume for the sake of the argument the popular Bayesian explication of the function of conditional 37 The example here is in the spirit of Greco's (2017) contextualist explication of Bayesian updating. Greco (2017: p. 2.3) argues that from context to context the propositions that we can treat as foundational can shift. In Heathwood's table example, we treat it as foundational that our experience of a table is veridical, but in the context of our presentation of the case we cannot take the experience of the table as veridical because there is a salient possibility that we are deceived by a hologram. Therefore, the proposition is not anymore foundational. According to the Bayesian account of defeaters Greco (2017: section 2.1) sketches, we can formalize the above as follows. In Heathwood's scenario Pr(H/E) is sufficiently high, but in the revised scenario there is a defeater E and, therefore, the Pr(H/E&E) is not sufficiently high. 38 The claim that probability is entirely descriptive and nonnormative would surprise at least some probability theorists. Handfield (2012: pp. 22-23) , for example, suggests that 'the central role of chance' is normative and discusses at some length (2012: pp. 17-33) the concepts of 'given information', 'admissible' and 'available evidence'. probability [Pr(H\E) = Pr(E\H).Pr(H)\P(E)]. 39 We can have some leeway about this because, although Heathwood is not very explicit of his interpretation of probability (conditional or unconditional), he does talk of probability, given evidence, which indicates the conditionality of probability of a belief on evidence and of course Bayes' framework is a popular explication of conditional probability. 40 As has been pointed out (cf. Greco (2017)), a Bayesian framework has to answer at least two normative, epistemic questions 41 :
1. What criteria must prior probability functions meet in order to be rationally permissible? 42 This is relevant to calculation of the prior probability of the hypothesisbelief [Pr(H)]. 2. What criteria must evidence propositions meet in order to be rationally updated upon? This is relevant to calculation of the prior probability of evidence [Pr(E)].
We have already introduced and discussed a bit the second question when we suggested that it is unclear how we collect, sieve and weigh evidence upon which we can update other propositions. But the first question is also a central question in Bayesian epistemology because how to assign the prior probability of a hypothesis is of critical importance for calculation of Bayesian updating because the updating depends in part on the prior probability of the hypothesis. The problem is that calculation of prior probabilities seems to involve irreducible epistemic normativity. Prior probabilities are assigned in terms of degree of confidence in a belief (i.e. subjective credence) and, as we have stressed above, degree of confidence should come from the given evidence and, importantly, how to collect the totality of available data, sieve them for relevance and weigh this relevant evidence. For different people may collect different bodies of available data as relevant evidence. Even if they collect the same body of data as prima facie relevant evidence, they may sieve it and distill it differently. And even if they sieve it in the same way different 39 As an anonymous referee observed, debunkers have to assume a non-subjective interpretation of Bayesian epistemology if a debunking argument is to have any cogency because moral, religious, metaphysical etc. beliefs could have perfectly probabilistically coherent priors within a subjectivist Bayesian framework. At any rate, Heathwood's (2009: p. 93 ) account of probability is objectivist and a good fit for debunkers because he insists that probability facts are 'objective patterns in the world'. Thanks to the anonymous referee for the point. 40 Rowland (2013: p. 9 ) also finds Heathwood (2009) somewhat unclear on what concept of probability he is employing. 41 See Greco (2017: p. 13 ) for presentation and discussion of these two questions. Williamson (2000 Williamson ( : pp. 2016 Williamson ( -2017 also underlines that it is a critical question what evidence an agent has and should conditionalize upon. As an anonymous referee observed, there is also the further question whether we should strictly conditionalize and be fully confident in some empirical claims or only Jeffrey conditionalize. Greco (2017) seems to suggest that we should strictly conditionalize upon some empirical claims in some contexts but not in some other contexts. This contextualist approach allows us to accept that some empirical claims can be treated as foundational in some contexts but not in all and, therefore, no empirical claim is in principle non-revisable. Greco's contextualist maneuver is meant to strike some middle ground between traditional foundationalism and coherentism. Thanks to an anonymous referee that brought Greco (2017) to my attention as well as the Williamson (2000) discussion of evidential probability. 42 For some discussion of 'the problem of the priors' see Mellor (2005) , Talbott (2008) and Childers (2013) . See Brosnan (2011) for virtually the same point as applied to evolutionary debunking arguments. people may weigh the same evidence differently and, therefore, assign varying degrees of probability.
These are normative, epistemic questions that the appeal to mere empirical perception can do little to address. In view of this observation, we can return to Heathwood's inductive and deductive example of epistemic reasonability and see how our worries about epistemic reductionism impinge on his intuitive examples. I indicate that it is at best unclear whether probability facts are reducible to descriptive, natural facts (where evidence of natural facts we can presumably have by appeal to simple descriptive experience).
Take first the inductive example, which is also more straightforward to understand in terms of probabilistic reasoning than the deductive example: the 'connection' between two events, streets being wet and having rained [pr(R\W)]. According to Heathwood, what makes it true that is probable that it has rained is the natural fact that streets are wet [pr(R\W) > 0.5]. But, contrary to Heathwood's claim, what makes this true (assuming that is true) in some contexts is not any reductive, natural fact (where evidence for natural facts we can collect on the basis of simple descriptive experience). If it is a probability fact in some contexts, it is one that does not seem natural as it does not seem in the world. Perhaps the probability fact supervenes on natural facts (where evidence for natural facts we can collect on the basis of descriptive experience, but it need not be very simple experience as we have seen with the table example and the difficult question of fixing the prior of evidence pr [E] ), but again this is not to reduce the one to the other.
Indeed, if we recall one of Hume's enduring lessons, there is no (a priori or a posteriori) causal or probabilistic 'connection' between the two natural facts (e.g. of the streets being wet and having rained). At least there is not one that is obviously descriptively natural. Perhaps there are such causal or probabilistic 'connections' between facts or events but these are irreducible and we are somehow cognitively capable of tracking them. 43 Or perhaps we only project and impose such causal or probabilistic 'connections' in the world and this works but, really, there are no such 'connections' (reducible or irreducible). 44 True enough, we often take it that if the streets are wet then it is probable that it has rained [pr(R\W) > 0.5]. But when we make this assertion, we don't make it because we literally perceive any descriptive causal or probabilistic 'connection' between these two natural facts. Prima facie it seems that there is no obvious descriptive causal or probabilistic 'metaphysical glue' between natural facts. It is because we exercise our epistemic judgment on the basis of past experience (where we inductively collect data, distill relevant evidence and weigh it, even if by Humean-habitual subconscious processing) as it could very well be the case that the streets are wet but not because it has rained.
Relevant evidence underdetermines (a la Quine-Duhem) what is possible and there are multiple, coherent, possible facts that could render the streets wet. Maybe there has been some filming and artificial rain was poured down the streets or the streets are wet because of a very humid night and so on. We are required as rational agents to collect data, distill and weigh relevant evidence and decide abductively what possible event the relevant evidence best supports and renders it probable. As with the previously canvassed table example, in some contexts there might be a relevant possibility that the streets are wet but not because of rain (say, if the weather was sunny and there was some filming in the neighborhood). This implies that wet streets need not render it a probable fact that it has rained [¬ pr(R\W)) > 0.5] and, therefore, the natural fact of wet streets need not reduce the probability fact of rain, given wet streets.
Second, the deductive example: If Xena is older than Yolanda and Yolanda is older than Zooey, Xena is older than Zooey. According to Heathwood, what makes this deductive-probability claim true is the natural fact that Xena's being older than Yolanda and Yolanda's being older that Zooey entails that Xena is older than Zooey. Yet, contrary to Heathwood's claim, the deductive-probability assertion that if Xena is older than Yolanda and that Yolanda is older than Zooey, Xena is older than Zooey is not made true by any descriptive, natural fact. This is the case because there is no obvious reductive natural fact that could be the truthmaker of the statement. Perhaps the probability fact supervenes on natural facts (where evidence for natural facts we can collect on the basis of descriptive experience), but this is not to reduce one to the other. The statement is a conditional and therefore it can be descriptive of another possible world, not the actual world 45 ; at least if we assume a descriptivist understanding of the semantics of probability/modal discourse. And this is an unsurprising result because deduction has at first instance to do not with how things are in the actual world but with how things could be and could not be, hence, the reference to the possible worlds apparatus. 46 In conclusion, if the argument presented is to the right direction, both moral and epistemic normativity belong to the 'ought' side and not to the descriptive 'is' side (and Hume might have been content with this result). 47 Probability, at least conditional probability, is normative and irreducible to descriptive facts and experience and, therefore, our argument need not worry about the objection that probability is nonnormative and reducible to mere descriptive facts and experience.
Of course, we have not made a conclusive case for this claim as how to understand (epistemic) probability, evidence and their relation are hotly debated issues on 45 Such a possible world if real (not fictional or a noncognitive projection) and not reducible (concrete a la Lewis), would presumably be a Plantingian abstract entity and, therefore, we would be committed to an antireductionist understanding of the subset of possibilia that are probability facts. It would offer us what Handfield (2012: p. 33 ) calls a 'primitivist' account. I suppose that epistemically probable possible worlds are those that, given the relevant evidence, are sufficiently nearby the actual world. Remote possible worlds would represent improbable facts, given the relevant evidence. Worlds with epistemic probability 1 would be worlds where the possible and probable worlds are identified because they would represent necessary states of affairs. In the case of Heathwood's deductive example, the represented world is necessary for all possible worlds and therefore it is by entailment a probable world as well. As a necessary world, it also includes the actual world. 46 Of course, there have also been defended ontologically light, deflationary approaches to modal talk. See Blackburn (Blackburn 1993a, b, c) : pp. 52-74). 47 Compare Hume (1777 Hume ( /2005 ): 'Chance…means not any real power which has anywhere a being in nature'. their own right. More modestly, we have made a first gesture towards defending that (epistemic) probability and evidence are normative and irreducible to mere descriptive facts and experience and this suffices for current purposes. 48 
